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WHISKEY AND THE WIRES: THE
INADVISABLE APPLICATION OF THE
WIRE FRAUD STATUTE TO ALCOHOL
SMUGGLING AND FOREIGN TAX EVASION
I. INTRODUCTION
In Pasquantino v. United States,' the Supreme Court held that a
scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue violates the wire
fraud statute.2 The Court further held that the common law revenue rule
does not preclude prosecutions for wire fraud violations arising from such a
scheme.3 In reaching these conclusions, the Court affirmed the convictions
of three men who had been prosecuted under the wire fraud statute4 for a
scheme to evade Canadian excise taxes by smuggling alcohol into Canada
from the United States.5 The Supreme Court's decision is correct to the
extent that it asserts that the wire fraud statute does not derogate from any
well-established revenue rule principle barring prosecution for a scheme to
evade foreign taxes.6 However, the Court's ruling is, ultimately, erroneous
because a scheme to evade foreign taxes does not properly fall within the
scope of the wire fraud statute.
This Note examines several reasons why wire fraud prosecutions
arising from a scheme to evade foreign taxes are not barred by the common
law revenue rule. First, the rule only prohibits domestic courts from direct
enforcement of a foreign sovereign's tax judgments or unadjudicated tax
claims. Within American revenue rule jurisprudence, no well-established
principle bars prosecution for domestic criminal conduct when it may also
result in the indirect enforcement of foreign revenue laws.7 Second, the
traditional rationales underlying the revenue rule-national sovereignty,
' 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1770 (2005).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000).
5 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1770, 1781.
6 Id. at 1774.
7 See discussion infra Parts VI.A. 1-3.
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separation of powers, and judicial competency--do not suggest that wire
fraud prosecutions for a scheme to evade foreign taxes should be barred.8
Finally, the revenue rule is discretionary in nature and does not sweep so
broadly as to establish an absolute prohibition upon prosecutions involving
any degree of recognition of foreign revenue laws. 9
This Note also argues that the Supreme Court's decision is wrong
because it misinterprets the boundaries of the wire fraud statute and, in turn,
gives it extraterritorial effect not clearly intended by Congress. At first
glance, a scheme to evade foreign taxes appears to meet the statute's literal
terms. 10 Yet, the statute's literal terms cannot be evaluated in a vacuum.
Therefore, these terms must be assessed within a broader frame of reference
that includes the statute's legislative history, principles of statutory
construction, and related congressional enactments.11  The legislative
history weighs against the Court's ruling since the statute was drafted with
a focus on domestic schemes, and concomitant domestic injuries resulting
from misuse of United States wires. 12 Moreover, the decision runs afoul of
the Court's long-held presumption that Congress ordinarily intends for its
statutes to have only domestic, and not extraterritorial, application.13 Prison
sentences and restitution awards resulting from wire fraud convictions for
smuggling schemes are calculated based on the combined impact of the
domestic and extraterritorial conduct. 14 Absent a clearer directive from
Congress, the Court's decision grants an unwarranted extension of the reach
of federal criminal law to prosecute and punish strongly intertwined
domestic and foreign conduct.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE FEDERAL WIRE FRAUD STATUTE
The Federal Communications Commission championed the adoption
of a federal wire fraud statute out of concern that "the rapid growth of
interstate communication facilities . . .had given rise to a variety of
8 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1774, 1779-81; see discussion infra Parts VI.A.4.a-c.
9 See discussion infra Part VI.A.3.
10 See discussion infra Parts VI.B.1-2.
" See discussion infra Parts VI.C. 1-4.
12 See discussion infra Part VI.C.2.
13 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1782 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see discussion infra Part
VI.C. 1.
14 Id. at 1783-84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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fraudulent activities . . . which were not within the range of existing law."15
Enacted in 1952, the federal wire fraud statute reads as follows:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire,
radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings,
signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the
violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than
$ 1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
16
Thus, to convict a person for a wire fraud violation, the government
must show that there was: (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) money or
property was the object of the scheme or artifice; and (3) use of the wires in
furtherance of the scheme or artifice. 7 Also, the government must prove
that the defendant possessed specific intent to defraud, which in turn
requires a showing that the defendant meant for some harm to result from
his deceit.' 8 It is unnecessary to prove that the intended victim of the fraud
was, in fact, harmed.' 9 Rather, it is sufficient to show that the defendant
contemplated doing actual harm; something more than merely deceiving the
victim. 20  Finally, "although use of the wires is required, its role in the
offense is merely perfunctory because the crux of the offense is the
fraudulent conduct."
2 1
Also, the mail 22 and wire fraud statutes operate in a very similar
fashion.2 3 Scholars note that these statutes have been construed "to cover
virtually any form of deceitful activity" involving the mail or wires.
24
'5 S. REP. No. 84-1873, at 1 (1956).
16 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000).
17 Id. § 1343 & 1343 n.31; Fountain v. United States, 357 F.3d 250, 255 (2d Cir. 2004);
United States v. Loney, 959 F.2d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Drake, 932
F.2d 861, 863 (10th Cir. 1991).
18 Loney, 959 F.2d at 1337 (citing United States v. St. Gelais, 952 F.2d 90, 95 (5th Cir.
1992)).
19 United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1005-06 n.14 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Government
need not show that the scheme's victims were in fact defrauded ... [but only] that some
actual harm or injury was at least contemplated.") (citation omitted); United States v. Curtis,
537 F.2d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 1976) ("[I]t is not necessary to show that any person was in
fact defrauded.").
20 United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 420 (2d Cir. 1991).
21 Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Opening Letters, 43 S.C. L. REv. 223, 231 (1992).
22 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
23 Podgor, supra note 21, at 231.
24 Brad D. Brian, et al., Mail Fraud, Wire Fraud, and Securities Fraud as Predicate Acts
in Civil RICO Actions, 155 PRACTISING L. INST. LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC.: CRIM. L. & URB.
PROBS. 59, 86 (1990).
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Further, the elements of both statutes are, in relevant part, the same, and
cases construing mail fraud apply equally to wire fraud.25
B. THE COMMON LAW REVENUE RULE
1. The Birth of the Revenue Rule: English Origins & Lord Mansfield's
Dicta
Originally, the revenue rule was meant to promote commerce, and it
stood for the general principle that courts will refrain from enforcing the
revenue laws of another sovereign nation. 6 The rule developed in the
English courts in the context of cases in which the defendant pointed to
foreign export, customs, or stamp laws as a defense against the alleged
validity of a contract.27 At the time in which the early English cases were
decided, nations commonly imposed such measures to promote commercial
convenience and advance their mercantile interests.2 8
The roots of the revenue rule are typically traced to Lord Mansfield's
oft-quoted dictum 29 in Holman v. Johnson that "no country ever takes
notice of the revenue laws of another., 30  In Holman, a French citizen
sought payment for tea that he had sold to Johnson, an Englishman.3'
Johnson purchased the tea with the intention of smuggling it into England
25 Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1771 n.2 (2005) ("[W]e have construed
identical language in the wire and mail fraud statutes in pari materia."); Carpenter v. United
States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987) (stating that "[t]he mail and wire fraud statutes share the
same language in relevant part, and accordingly we apply the same analysis to both sets of
offenses ...."); see also Brian, supra note 24, at 67-68.
26 William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARv. INT'L L.J. 161, 170
(2002).
27 Id.
28 European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456, 479 (E.D.N.Y. 2001),
ajfd, 355 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 193
S.W.2d 919, 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946)); Dodge, supra note 26, at 171.
29 However, unlike a court holding, dictum is not a controlling statement of the law.
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 379 (1994) ("It is to the holdings of our
cases, rather than their dicta, that we must attend ...."). Thus, some scholars assert that the
revenue rule is simply an "archaic vestige" of the common law springing forth from
statements by Lord Mansfield that had no bearing upon the actual facts of the cases over
which he presided. William J. Kovatch, Jr., Recognizing Foreign Tax Judgments: An
Argument for the Revocation of the Revenue Rule, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 265, 267, 273 (2000).
30 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775); Dodge, supra note 26, at 170; see, e.g., HM the
Queen in Right of the Province of B.C. v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979)
(stating "Lord Mansfield is generally credited as being the first to express the revenue rule");
European Cmty., 150 F. Supp. 2d at 478 ("The origin of the revenue rule is nearly always
traced to Lord Mansfield's often-repeated and conclusory dictum in Holman ... .
31 Kovatch, supra note 29, at 272.
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and avoiding customs duties.32 At trial, Johnson alleged that Holman was
aware of this illegal aim at the time of the contract's formation and was not
entitled to payment for the tea since this illegal objective made the contract
invalid.33 Lord Mansfield declined to apply the choice of law principle
which states that the laws of the country in which the cause of action arose
shall govern in disputes involving contracts formed abroad.34 In essence, he
modified the traditional conflicts of law rule to include an exception
applicable to contract cases in which the disputed contract was made abroad
with the aim of flouting English revenue laws.35
Several years later, Lord Mansfield once again applied the revenue
rule in Planche v. Fletcher.36 In Planche, a cargo insurer refused to cover a
client, alleging that he had fraudulently claimed that the cargo originated in
London rather than Ostend, Belgium, in order to circumvent higher French
duties on English goods.3 7 Lord Mansfield ruled against the insurer and
held that fraud had not occurred because the client simply acted in
accordance with a common custom in the shipping trade.38 He then
proceeded to state, as dicta, "at any rate, this was no fraud in this country.
One nation does not take notice of the revenue laws of another.,
39
However, even in Lord Mansfield's day, the revenue rule did not bar
all enforcement of foreign revenue law without exception.40 For example,
the English courts were fully prepared to invalidate foreign contracts which
omitted certain tax stamps required under foreign revenue law.4' By
voiding foreign contracts, the English courts enforced foreign revenue law




34 See European Cmty., 150 F. Supp. 2d at 478; Kovatch, supra note 29, at 272-73.
35 See European Cmty., 150 F. Supp. 2d at 478.
36 (1779) 99 Eng. Rep. 164 (K.B.).
37 European Cmty., 150 F. Supp. 2d at 478.
38 Id.
39 Planche, 99 Eng. Rep. at 165.
40 Pasquantino v, United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1778 (2005) (noting the early English
cases of Clegg v. Levy, (1812) 170 Eng. Rep. 1343 (N.P.), and Alves v. Hodgson, (1797) 101
Eng. Rep. 953 (K.B.)).
41 Clegg, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1343; Alves, 101 Eng. Rep. at 953.
42 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1778.
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2. The Revenue Rule Crosses the Atlantic: Learned Hand Contributes His
Two Pence
By the time the revenue rule was adopted in the United States, the
primary justification for the rule had changed. The focus had shifted to the
issues of judicial competence and direct enforcement of the revenue laws,
final tax judgments, and unadjudicated tax claims of foreign sovereigns.
43
The new justification asserted that courts lack the competence to assess
whether the enforcement of a foreign tax judgment would run counter to the
local public policy and, therefore, whether the foreign revenue law should
be enforced. 4 Thus, the common law revenue rule came to stand for the
principle that the courts of one country will not enforce foreign tax
judgments or unadjudicated tax claims.
During the early twentieth century, American courts first applied the
revenue rule in the domestic interstate context as a basis to reject suits
brought by sister states to collect taxes.45 In Moore v. Mitchell,46 Judge
Learned Hand penned the classic formulation of the revenue rule and its
prohibition against one state collecting its taxes in the courts of another.47
Hand concluded that:
To pass upon the provisions for the public order of another state is, or at any rate
should be, beyond the powers of a court; it involves the relations between the states
themselves, with which courts are incompetent to deal, and which are intrusted [sic] to
other authorities. It may commit the domestic state to a position which would
seriously embarrass its neighbor. Revenue laws fall within the same reasoning; they
affect a state in matters as vital to its existence as its criminal laws. No court ought to
undertake an inquiry which it cannot prosecute without determining whether those
laws are consonant with its own notions of what is proper.48
Thus, Learned Hand asserted that it was preferable to preclude any
enforcement of foreign laws as a whole than to risk having to find such
laws contrary to public policy and cause embarrassment for a foreign
state.49
43 Sean D. Murphy, "Revenue Rule " Barring of Foreign Suits Concerning Cigarettes, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 715, 716 (2002) ("The revenue rule is a longstanding common law doctrine
providing that courts of one sovereign will not enforce final tax judgments or unadjudicated
tax claims of other sovereigns." (quoting Attorney Gen. of Can. v. RJR Tobacco Holdings,
268 F.3d 103, 109-13 (2d Cir. 2001))).
44 Philip R. West & Keith Sieverding, Supreme Court Decision May Impact Foreign Tax
Planning, A.B.A. NEWS Q., SEC. OF TAX'N, Summer 2005, at 5.
45 Dodge, supra note 26, at 172.
46 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929).
47 Id. at 603-04 (Hand, J., concurring); see also Dodge, supra note 26, at 173.
48 Moore, 30 F.2d at 604 (Hand, J., concurring).
49 Id.; Dodge, supra note 26, at 173.
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Shortly after the Moore decision, the Supreme Court rejected Hand's
argument as it applied to domestic interstate suits, in Milwaukee County v.
M, E. White Co. ° The Court held that the revenue rule could not serve to
preclude enforcement of sister states' tax judgments because of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause in the Constitution.51 However, Hand's logic has
continued to influence courts in the international context when they are
presented with actions involving a foreign sovereign's efforts to obtain
direct enforcement of tax claims or judgments.52 Although this logic has its
detractors, it is relatively well-accepted today "that one nation may not
enforce a tax claim or judgment directly in another nation's courts-
because of a reluctance to scrutinize the foreign tax law, sovereignty
concerns, administrative difficulties, or some combination of these
reasons." 53 Thus, the English courts' desire to promote trade was cast aside
in favor of an emphasis upon jurisdictional and prudential considerations. 4
C. PROSECUTION FOR FOREIGN TAX EVASION UNDER THE WIRE
FRAUD STATUTE
1. The First Circuit: United States v. Boots
55
In 1996, the First Circuit became the first appellate court to address the
issue of whether an individual could be prosecuted for a wire fraud
violation based upon a scheme to defraud a foreign government of its tax
revenue.56 In United States v. Boots, the defendants had devised and carried
out a scheme to smuggle tobacco from a Native American reservation in
New York into Canada without paying the excise taxes imposed by the
50 296 U.S. 268, 279 (1935).
51 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Milwaukee County, 296 U.S. at 279.
52 Dodge, supra note 26, at 174.
53 Id. at 176; see also HM the Queen in Right of the Province of B.C. v. Gilbertson, 597
F.2d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir. 1979); Banco do Brasil, S. A. v. A. C. Isr. Commodity Co., Inc.,
190 N.E.2d 235, 237 (N.Y. 1963); United States v. Harden, [1963] 41 D.L.R. 2d 721 (Can.).
But see Attorney Gen. of Can. v. RJR Tobacco Holdings, 103 F. Supp. 2d 134, 140 n.3
(N.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Were the Court writing on a clean
slate .. . , it would be inclined to find the Revenue Rule to be outdated ... and the rationales
for the rule to be largely unpersuasive, at least with respect to the recognition of foreign tax
judgments."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 483 n.2 (1987) ("In an age
when virtually all states impose and collect taxes and when instantaneous transfer of assets
can be easily arranged, the rationale for not recognizing or enforcing tax judgments is largely
obsolete."); Kovatch, supra note 29, at 277-80.
54 Dodge, supra note 26, at 179.
55 80 F.3d 580 (1st Cir. 1996).
56 See Boots, 80 F.3d at 580.
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Canadian government.57 The Boots court held that the defendants' wire
fraud convictions were to be reversed because foreign tax and customs
frauds were not schemes to defraud within the meaning of the wire fraud
statute. 58
The First Circuit noted that "[floreign customs and tax frauds [were]
intertwined with enforcement of a foreign sovereign's own laws and
policies to raise and collect such revenue . . . ,59 The American legal
system adhered to a common law revenue rule which dictated that courts
typically will not enforce foreign revenue laws.60 Affirmation of the wire
fraud convictions would equate to enforcement of Canadian customs and
tax laws since the court would have to assess the validity of a foreign
government's revenue laws in order to rule on the defendants' challenges to
their convictions for violating those same laws.6 1 Further, interpretation
and application of foreign law by a domestic court ran the risk of
undermining the "foreign policymaking powers" of the executive and
legislative branches.62 Additionally, upholding these convictions would
open the door to future prosecutions against smugglers, irrespective of
whether the victim foreign government had agreed to reciprocity with the
United States.63 Finally, the rule of lenity counseled against affirmation of
the convictions because "the harsher of two possible readings of a criminal
statute will be enforced only when Congress has spoken clearly."
64
2. The Second Circuit: United States v. Trapilo
65
The Second Circuit was presented with a similar legal quandary the
following year. In United States v. Trapilo, the defendants purchased liquor
57 id.
58 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000); Boots, 80 F.3d at 588-89.
59 Boots, 80 F.3d at 587.
60 Id.; Holman v. Johnson, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B.).
61 Boots, 80 F.3d at 587.
62 Id. at 587-88 (stating that there is a general principle of noninterference by the federal
courts in the legislative and executive branches' exercise of their foreign policymaking
powers).
63 See 18 U.S.C. § 546. The anti-smuggling statute's reciprocity requirement exists to
ensure that § 546 will only be applied when a given foreign government has enacted
reciprocal legislation prohibiting smuggling into the United States. Pasquantino v. United
States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1786 (2005).
64 Boots, 80 F.3d at 588 (stating that there is a presumption that Congress legislates with
domestic applications in mind unless it expressly states otherwise). The wire fraud statute
does not expressly state that Congress contemplated a foreign application for "any scheme or
artifice to defraud." 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Yet, it does refer to wire communications in
"interstate or foreign commerce." Id.
65 130 F.3d 547, 549 (2d Cir. 1997).
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over the telephone and smuggled it into Canada, thereby avoiding payment
of customs duties.66  The Trapilo court rejected the reasoning in Boots,
reversed the defendants' prior acquittals, and held that a scheme to defraud
a foreign government of tax revenue fell within the scope of the wire fraud
statute.67
In rejecting the rationale of Boots, the Second Circuit asserted that the
wire fraud statute's wording unambiguously barred a person from using the
interstate and foreign communication systems if they "intend[ed] to devise
any scheme or artifice to defraud., 68 Also, "the statute neither expressly,
nor impliedly" prohibited the government from prosecuting a person for a
scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue.69 According to the
Second Circuit, the wire fraud statute expressly covered frauds involving
foreign transactions. 70 The defendants could not avoid prosecution under
the wire fraud statute simply because their intended victim was a foreign
government.71
Thus, even if the common law revenue rule were pertinent to the
matter, which it was not, it still did not provide a justification for departing
from the statute's plain meaning.72 The mail and wire fraud statutes both
proscribed, on the one hand, forming a scheme to defraud and, on the other
hand, using the mails and wires to advance that scheme.73 Further, both
statutes punished "the scheme [itself], not its success. 74  Therefore, the
defendants' intent to defraud did not turn on whether or not they were able
to circumvent Canadian revenue laws.75 As a result, it was unnecessary for
the Second Circuit to assess the validity of Canada's tax and excise laws.
and the common law revenue rule was not implicated.76
In 2000, in ruling on an appeal by two of the Trapilo defendants, the
Second Circuit once again concluded that a scheme to defraud a foreign
government of its tax revenue fell within the meaning of the wire fraud
66 Id. at 549.
67 Id. at 553.
68 Id. at 551; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1343; United States v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757, 761 (2d
Cir. 1983).
69 Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 551; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
70 Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 552.
71 id.
72 Id. at 55 1.
73 Id. (citing Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958)).
74 Id. at 552 (citing United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 94 (2d Cir. 1991)).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 553 ("Our goal is simply to vindicate the intended purpose of the statute, that is,
'to prevent the use of [our telecommunication systems] in furtherance of fraudulent
enterprises."' (quoting United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1005 (2d Cir. 1980))).
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statute and that criminal prosecution for such a scheme was not precluded
by the common law revenue rule.77 It is true that the court reversed the
defendants' convictions for conspiracy to launder money under a wire fraud
scheme because the government failed to submit evidence that Canada in
fact taxed or levied a duty upon imported liquor.7 8 Yet, the Second Circuit
reiterated the idea that the statute punished intent to defraud, which did not
hinge upon the defendants' success in violating Canadian tax and excise
laws.79
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
David and Carl Pasquantino, while in New York, ordered liquor over
the telephone from discount package stores in Maryland.80  They then
employed numerous other individuals to smuggle the liquor across the
Canadian border in their automobiles without paying the substantial excise
taxes that Canada imposed upon imported alcohol. 8' Canada had raised the
excise taxes on liquor to such a level that Canadian taxes significantly
exceeded comparable United States taxes. 82  Following their arrest, the
Pasquantinos and one of their conspirators, Arthur Hilts, were indicted for
and convicted of wire fraud for devising and implementing a scheme to
smuggle liquor into Canada from the United States.8 3  Further, the
defendants' terms of imprisonment were substantially augmented when
their offense levels were increased due to the calculated tax revenue loss to
the Canadian and Ontario governments.84 The base offense level for a
violation of the wire fraud statute is six, and, for defendants with a criminal
history category of I, the guideline range for such violation is zero to six
months.85  Due to the tax revenue loss calculations, the Pasquantinos'
77 United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 163-64, 167 (2d Cir. 2000).
78 Id. at 167-68.
79 Id. at 164.
80 Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1770 (2005).
81 Id. In fact, the Canadian taxes due on the alcohol purchased in the United States were
roughly double the liquor's purchase price. Id.
82 United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 2003), aff'd, 125 S. Ct. 1766
(2005). During the original trial, a Canadian Customs Intelligence Officer had testified that
the hefty excise taxes on liquor actually resulted from a combination of four separate taxes: a
Canadian federal excise tax and general sales tax, a Liquor Control Board of Ontario tax, and
a provincial sales tax on imported liquor. Id. at 326. The officer estimated that the
equivalent of approximately one hundred American dollars would be "due and owing" on a
case of liquor that was purchased in the United States for fifty-six American dollars and
imported into Canada. Id. at 334.
83 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1770.
94 Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 342 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 342 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
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offense levels were increased by thirteen and Hilts' offense level was
increased by eleven.16 Consequently, the Pasquantinos were sentenced to
fifty-seven months' imprisonment on each of six counts, to be served
concurrently, and Hilts was sentenced to twenty-one months'
imprisonment.
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Prior to trial, the defendants sought to obtain a dismissal, alleging that
the government lacked a sufficient interest in enforcing Canadian revenue
laws and, therefore, their indictments failed to state a wire fraud violation.
88
The district court denied the motion, and, after the ensuing trial, the
defendants were convicted of wire fraud. 89
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit initially reversed the defendants'
convictions.9" The court decided that the prosecutions ran afoul of the
common law revenue rule since it forced the court to recognize and assess
Canadian revenue laws.9 1 At the same time, the court squarely rejected the
defendants' contention that Canada's right to tax them did not constitute
"money or property" within the meaning of the wire fraud statute.92 Then,
the Fourth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc, vacated the earlier appellate
ruling, and affirmed the defendants' convictions. 93 This decision to reverse
course flowed from the conclusion that the common law revenue rule
"simply allowed courts to refuse to enforce the tax judgments of foreign
nations" instead of "barring any recognition of foreign revenue law"
86 Id. at 342-43 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 326.
88 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1770.
89 Id.
90 United States v. Pasquantino, 305 F.3d 291, 292 (4th Cir. 2002), vacated, 336 F.3d
321 (4th Cir. 2003), af'd, 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005). However, Judge Hamilton broke with the
rest of the panel in a vigorous dissent. Id. at 299 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). First, Hamilton
argued that the court was mistaken in determining that the revenue rule barred prosecution
because such prosecution was the functional equivalent of penal enforcement of Canadian
customs and tax laws. Id. (Hamilton, J., dissenting). In his view, such prosecution simply
enforced a domestic criminal statute and did nothing civilly or criminally to enforce any
Canadian tax claims or judgments. Id. (Hamilton, J., dissenting). Second, Hamilton asserted
that the court was imposing its own expanded version of the common law revenue rule on
section 1343 as a matter of judicial policy. Id. at 300 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). Thus, the
court's opinion judicially rewrote the plain language of the statute absent any authority to
take such an action. Id. (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 295.
92 Id. at 294-95; id. at 299 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).




altogether.94 Also, the court held that Canada's right to receive tax revenue
counted as "money or property" within the meaning of the statute. 95
V. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. JUSTICE THOMAS'S MAJORITY OPINION
96
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split over
whether a scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue violates
the wire fraud statute.97 In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court ruled
that the broad language of the wire fraud statute authorized the government
to prosecute an individual for scheming to defraud a foreign government of
tax revenue, and that the common law revenue rule did not preclude such a
prosecution.
98
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Thomas, concluded that the
defendants' scheme fell within the scope of the statute. 99 First, Canada's
right to uncollected taxes on the imported alcohol amounted to "money or
property" in its hands.100 The tax evasion entailed in the smuggling
enterprise was aimed at depriving Canada of money legally due.'0 ' Thus,
the object of the defendants' scheme was to deprive that nation of its
"property."'' 0 2 Second, the defendants' enterprise constituted "a scheme or
artifice to defraud" because they had concealed the imported liquor from
customs officials and failed to declare those goods on customs forms.
10 3




94 Pasquantino 125 S. Ct. at 1771 (citing Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 327-29).
95 Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 331-32.
96 Justice Thomas wrote for the majority, which included of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Stevens.
97 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1771.
9' Id. at 1781.
99 Id. at 1771. The defendants' disputed only two of the three elements necessary for a
wire fraud violation. Id. Clearly, the defendants had made use of the wires in furtherance of
some activity or enterprise when they made phone calls to purchase alcohol and arrange for
its transport across the Canadian border. Id. at 1770. Therefore, the defendants only
disputed that they had engaged in "a scheme or artifice to defraud" and that "money or
property" had been the object of the alleged scheme or artifice. Id. at 1771.
'00 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000); Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1771.
101 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct at 1772.
'02 Id.
103 18 U.S.C. § 1343; Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct at 1772-73.
104 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct at 1773 (citing Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313
(1896)).
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The majority rejected the defendants' argument that the Court's
reading of the wire fraud statute would derogate from the well-established
understanding of the common law revenue rule.10 5  First, the majority
stressed that as of 1952, the year that the federal wire fraud statute was
enacted, no decision in a common law revenue rule case had held or implied
that the revenue rule prohibited the government from prosecuting a scheme
to evade foreign taxes. 10 6 Unlike the actions historically prohibited by the
revenue rule, Pasquantino was not a suit directed at recovering a foreign tax
liability, but rather was a criminal prosecution initiated by the government
"in its sovereign capacity to punish domestic criminal conduct."' 1 7 None of
the holdings relied upon by the defendants involved a domestic sovereign
acting pursuant to authority conferred by a criminal statute. 0 8 Moreover,
any restitution award resulting from the prosecution would not serve a
primary purpose of collecting a foreign tax; instead, it was meant to impose
a punishment commensurate with the criminal conduct in question.
1 9
Further, the Court soundly rejected the claim that indirect enforcement of
revenue laws stood at the heart of the common law revenue rule, rather than
at its margins."0 Although criminal prosecution for wire fraud enforced
Canadian revenue laws in an indirect sense, the boundary drawn by the
revenue rule between impermissible and permissible enforcement of foreign
revenue laws had always been unclear."' Thus, as of 1952, the extent to
which the revenue rule actually prohibited indirect recognition of foreign
revenue laws was uncertain.12 The defendants had failed to provide case
law yielding "a rule sufficiently well established" to constrict the reading
and application of the wire fraud statute in the instant criminal
prosecution. 113
Second, the majority reasoned that the statute did not derogate from a
well-established revenue rule principle because the traditional rationales for
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1774.
107 Id. at 1775.
"08 Id. at 1776.
109 Id. at 1777.
11o Id.
11 Id. at 1778; In re Hollins, 139 N.Y.S. 713, 716-17 (N.Y. 1913) (holding that an estate
executor could satisfy foreign taxes due on a decedent's estate out of property of the estate,
notwithstanding a legatee's argument that the revenue rule barred authorizing such
payments).
112 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1778-79 (noting that "it is sometimes difficult to draw the
line between an issue involving merely recognition of a foreign law and indirect enforcement
of it" (citing A. Dicey & J. Morris, CONFLICT OF LAWS 90 (L. Collins gen. ed. 13th ed.
2000))).
113 Id. at 1779.
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justifying application of the rule did not indicate that prosecution was
clearly barred under the circumstances. 14 In assessing these rationales, it
addressed the notion that the rule ensures respect for national
sovereignty." 5 According to the majority, Pasquantino posed no real risk
of fostering international friction because the Executive, as represented by
federal prosecutors, presumably initiated this prosecution after assessing its
probable impact on the relationship between Canada and the United
States. "6
The majority was equally unmoved by the contention that the revenue
rule barred a court from giving domestic effect to politically sensitive and
controversial policy decisions embodied in foreign revenue laws, regardless
of whether or not a court needed to pass judgment on such laws.
17
Assuming it was permissible under the statute, the govermment's decision to
prosecute reflected the policy choice of both Congress and the Executive
"to free the interstate wires from fraudulent use, irrespective of the object of
the fraud."1 8
The majority found that the judicial competency rationale was not
implicated for two reasons. First, the government had presented
uncontroverted witness testimony at trial. Second, Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 26.1119 gave sufficient means to resolve incidental
issues of foreign law arising in wire fraud prosecutions. 20  Rule 26.1, in
part, frees federal courts from the restraints contained in the ordinary rules
of evidence in evaluating foreign law without causing unconstitutional
deprivation of the defendant's rights to confront witnesses testifying against
114 Id.
115 Id.; see supra notes 46-49 and the text accompanying those notes regarding Learned
Hand's classic formulation of this rationale.
116 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1779.
117 Id.; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting).
118 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1780.
119 FED. R. CRiM. P. 26.1 ("FRCP"). Rule 26.1 reads as follows:
A party intending to raise an issue of foreign law must provide the court and all parties with
reasonable written notice. Issues of foreign law are questions of law, but in deciding such issues
a court may consider any relevant material or source-including testimony- without regard to
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
120 Prior to the creation of FRCP 26.1, the federal courts looked to the common law and
state law analogs for methods of interpreting foreign laws. This approach occurred in the
context of both civil and criminal actions. Yet, these methods varied and often dictated
procedures that were time consuming, expensive, and inefficient were cumbersome and
inadequate. A. Nussbaum, Proving the Law of Foreign Countries, 3 AM. J. COMP. L. 60, 66-
67 (1954). Thus, these methods were often inapposite to determining the content of foreign
laws. Id. at 66-67.
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him.121 For instance, during both the trial and sentencing phases, a court
can rely upon testimony from a foreign nation's customs officials and tax
experts to help delineate the purpose and proper application of that
sovereign's tax laws. 122  Further, Rule 26.1 allows federal courts the
flexibility to review "any relevant material or source" to gain a complete
understanding of the foreign laws at issue in a given matter. 1
23
Finally, the majority determined that its reading of the wire fraud
statute did not have extraterritorial effect because the defendants' offense
was perfected as soon as they executed the scheme inside the United
States. 124 The government sought to punish the domestic aspect of their
conduct. 125 Regardless, the wire fraud statute could not be "a statute in
which Congress only had domestic concerns in mind" since its plain
language provided for punishment of frauds executed "in interstate or
foreign commerce."'
126
B. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S DISSENTING OPINION
127
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Ginsburg, asserted that the
common law revenue rule was directly implicated in this prosecution and
that Congress never sought to displace the revenue rule by enacting the wire
fraud statute. 128 The defendants' conduct could only be brought within the
scope of the wire fraud statute because their aim was to evade the customs
and tax laws of Canada. 129  Moreover, the results flowing from an
121 See FED. R. CRiM. P. 26.1 advisory committee's notes (1966).
122 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1780. At trial, a Canadian Customs Intelligence Officer
enumerated the excise taxes applicable to imported liquor and provided estimates of the
taxes that would be "due and owing" on cases of such liquor. United States v. Pasquantino,
336 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2003), affd, 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005). During the sentencing
phase, the court once again relied on the customs officer's testimony in assessing the validity
of the government's amount-of-loss computations. Id. at 343 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
These computations served as the basis for determining the defendants' terms of
imprisonment. Id. (Gregory, J., dissenting).
123 FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1 is substantially the
same as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1. Compare FED. R. CRiM. P. 26.1, with FED. R.
Civ. P. 44.1. For a complete description of the merits and practicability of these "sister"
rules, see FED. R. Civ. P. 26.1 advisory committee's notes (1966).
124 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1780; United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir.
2000).
125 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1780.
126 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000); Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1780-81.
127 Justice Ginsburg wrote for the dissent, in which Justice Breyer joined in the entire
dissent, and Justices Scalia and Souter joined in Parts II and III of the dissent. Id. at 1781
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 1786-87 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 1786 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Indeed, Ginsburg noted that "shorn of that
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application of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act ("MVRA") to wire
fraud offenses supported this point. 130  The MVRA applied to all
"offense[s] against property," 13 ' and stated that "[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of law ... the court shall order ... that the defendant make
restitution to the victim of the offense."'132 The dissent noted that at the
district court level, the government refrained from asking the court to
impose restitution as the victim was a foreign government suffering a loss
related to its tax laws.
133
According to Justice Ginsburg, the government's willingness to
overlook the MVRA in deference to the revenue rule demonstrated the need
for the Court to reject the government's overly-broad interpretation of the
wire fraud statute. 34 Further, the dissent declined to construe the MVRA as
excluding mandatory restitution in instances where wire fraud prosecutions
might bring the revenue rule into play. 35 Instead, the MVRA illustrated the
point that foreign taxes were not envisioned by Congress as an object of a
fraudulent scheme when it enacted the statute.' 
36
Next, the dissent posited that the rule of lenity required the Court to
conclude that "schemes directed solely at defrauding a foreign government
of tax revenue" did not constitute a scheme to defraud within the meaning
of the wire fraud statute. 137 Wire fraud was a predicate offense as set forth
in both the Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")
138
and the money laundering statute. 139 Therefore, finding that the defendants'
conduct amounted to wire fraud without "clear and definite language" in the
purpose, no other aspect of their conduct was criminal in this country." Id. (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
130 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.
131 Id. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii); Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct at 1787 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
132 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1); Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct at 1787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
133 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct at 1787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
114 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
135 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Congress, however, has expressed with notable clarity
a policy of mandatory restitution in all wire fraud prosecutions. In contrast, Congress was
quite ambiguous' concerning § 1343's coverage of schemes to evade foreign taxes.").
136 18 U.S.C. § 3663A; Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct at 1787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
137 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct at 1787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987)). The rule of lenity states that, when confronted with
"two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to choose the
harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language." Id. (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
13 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
9 Id. § 1956(c)(7)(A).
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statute would unfairly subject them to the possibility of harsh criminal
penalties and forfeitures.
140
In addition, Justice Ginsburg asserted that the majority decision
improperly bestowed extraterritorial effect upon the wire fraud statute by
reading it to include violations of foreign revenue laws. 141 Absent express
congressional intent, the Court refrained from interpreting statutes in a
manner that would reach conduct that was mainly another country's
concern.142  Even "a statute's express application to acts committed in
foreign commerce," without more, would be insufficient to signal
congressional intent "to give the statute extraterritorial effect."' 43 Further,
Congress had already made its general view of foreign customs and tax
laws quite clear. In both domestic legislation and treaties, Congress
provided for strict limitations on the assistance to be extended to foreign
countries.144 For example, Congress had enacted a specific anti-smuggling
statute criminalizing offenses of the genre carried out by the Pasquantinos.
The application of the anti-smuggling statute hinged upon whether or not a
given foreign government had enacted a reciprocal statute barring
smuggling into the United States.145  Yet, Canada failed to meet this
reciprocity requirement as it had not established a statute criminalizing
smuggling into the United States. 146 As another example, Justice Ginsburg
140 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct at 1787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 1784 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 1785 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting ) (citing Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
286 (1949)). For the most part, American courts have long adhered to the principle that
Congress primarily crafts and enacts statutes with domestic applications in mind. See also
Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1755 (2005); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197,
204 n.5 (1993). But see F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 542 U.S. 155, 164
(2004) (noting the presumption that "legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign
interests of other nations when they write American laws").
141 Id. at 1785 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 250-53 (1991)). The wire fraud statute refers to "any scheme or artifice to
defraud" by means "of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign
commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (emphasis added).
144 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct at 1785 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Attorney Gen. of
Can. v. RJR Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 119 (2d Cir. 2001).
145 18 U.S.C. § 546. The statute relates to the smuggling of goods into foreign countries
and reads, in pertinent part,
[a]ny person owning in whole or in part any vessel of the United States who employs.., such
vessel for the purpose of smuggling . . .any merchandise into the territory of any foreign
government in violation of the laws there in force, if under the laws of such foreign government
any penalty or forfeiture is provided for violation of the laws of the United States... shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id.
146 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct at 1786 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg made
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noted the "comprehensive" tax protocol existing between the United States
and Canada.147 Among other things, the protocol only applied to tax
judgments finalized under the requesting country's laws, and it prohibited




The majority correctly determined that the common law revenue rule
does not preclude the government from prosecuting a person under the wire
fraud statute for a scheme to evade foreign taxes. First, the revenue rule
only bars domestic courts from direct enforcement of a foreign sovereign's
tax judgments or unadjudicated tax claims. Within American revenue rule
jurisprudence, no well-established prohibition exists which would bar
government prosecution for domestic criminal conduct that may lead to
indirect enforcement of foreign revenue laws. Second, such a prosecution
does not run afoul of the traditional rationales underlying the revenue
rule-national sovereignty, separation of powers, and judicial competency.
Third, the rule is discretionary in nature and does not sweep so broadly as to
establish an absolute prohibition upon prosecutions involving any degree of
recognition of foreign revenue laws.
Although the majority arrived at the proper conclusion regarding the
common law revenue rule, it erred in finding that a scheme to evade foreign
taxes fell within the scope of the wire fraud statute. At first glance, this
type of scheme appears to meet the statute's literal terms. However, these
terms cannot be evaluated in a vacuum. When assessed in light of the
legislative history, principles of statutory construction, and tensions with
other congressional enactments, a prosecution for a scheme to evade foreign
taxes is properly interpreted as falling outside the intended scope of the
statute. Moreover, permitting the prosecution of such a scheme as a wire
fraud violation gives unintended extraterritorial effect to the statute.
mention of the anti-smuggling statute to convey a general conceptual point. She
acknowledged that § 546 would be inapplicable to the defendants' conduct in the instant case
since that provision required that a vessel be used to transport the smuggled goods into the
foreign country. Id. at 1786 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
147 Protocol Amending Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S.-
Can., art. 15, 2, Nov. 9, 1995, 2030 U.N.T.S. 236 [hereinafter Protocol]; Pasquantino, 125
S. Ct. at 1786 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
148 Protocol, supra note 147, at art. 15, 8.
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A. THE COMMON LAW REVENUE RULE DOES NOT BAR PROSECUTION
FOR A SCHEME TO EVADE FOREIGN TAXES UNDER THE WIRE
FRAUD STATUTE
1. American Revenue Rule Jurisprudence Precludes Only Direct
Recognition or Enforcement of Foreign Tax Judgments and Unadjudicated
Tax Claims
The majority's interpretation of the scope and application of the
revenue rule is consistent with the bulk of American case law. Early on, a
line of American cases established a prohibition on the enforcement of one
sovereign's tax liabilities in the courts of another sovereign, with a common
example being a suit to enforce a tax judgment. 49 "The revenue rule's
grounding in these cases shows that, at its core, it prohibited the collection
of tax obligations of foreign nations.' ' 50  Modem courts continue to
interpret the revenue rule as being pertinent to matters in which a foreign
government brings suit either to enforce a finalized tax judgment or to
litigate an unresolved tax claim.' 5' Further, the immediate response to
Pasquantino's holding, in European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,
suggests that a matter involving direct enforcement of foreign revenue laws
is still viewed as the setting in which the revenue rule is properly
implicated. 52  The Second Circuit emphasized in European Community
that, rather than entailing a prosecution by the United States government,
this case involved a civil lawsuit brought by foreign sovereigns whose sole
aim in bringing suit was to collect tax revenue and the costs connected with
its collection. 53  In assessing Pasquantino's impact, the European
149 See Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 603-04 (2d Cir. 1929), aJfd, 231 U.S. 18 (1930)
(L. Hand, J., concurring); Maryland v. Turner, 132 N.Y.S. 173, 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1911);
Arkansas v. Bowen, 9 Mackey 291, 295 (D.C. 1891). These cases involved a court in one
state determining that the common law revenue rule precluded that state from acting as a
collector of taxes for a sister state. Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1775. This approach to the
application of the revenue rule is transferable to suits brought by foreign sovereigns as well.
Id.
15o Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1775.
151 Attorney Gen. of Can. v. RJR Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.
2001) (describing the common law revenue rule as "a longstanding common law doctrine
providing that courts of one sovereign will not enforce final tax judgments or unadjudicated
tax claims of other sovereigns"); see also Michael A. Rosenhouse, Application of Common
Law Revenue Rule by Federal Courts, 4 A.L.R. FED. 279 (2005) (stating "the long-standing
common law revenue rule prevents the courts of one sovereign from enforcing or
adjudicating tax claims from another sovereign").
152 European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, 424 F.3d 175, 180-81 (2d Cir. 2005).
151 Id. at 177, 180. The Supreme Court had vacated and remanded this matter for
reconsideration in light of the Pasquantino decision, and the Second Circuit handily
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Community court "saw no reason why Pasquantino's analysis should
disturb our conclusion that the revenue rule bars civil RICO suits by foreign
governments against smugglers."'
' 54
The majority opinion presents a valid distinction between direct
enforcement of foreign revenue laws and indirect enforcement of these laws
as a byproduct of prosecutions which aim to punish fraudulent domestic
criminal conduct. There is a dearth of holdings which clearly signal that the
revenue rule prohibits our government from enforcing a domestic criminal
law; this is especially true when the nexus between the criminal prosecution
and enforcement of foreign revenue laws is attenuated. Thus, the
distinction between "impermissible and permissible 'enforcement' of
foreign revenue law" is unclear.1 55 At a minimum, American case law is
not well-settled enough to conclude that the revenue rule bars a prosecution
resulting in "indirect recognition of foreign revenue laws."'
156
2. American Courts Have Yet to Adopt a "Functional Equivalent" Standard
Extending the Revenue Rule's Scope to Prosecutions Involving Indirect
Enforcement of Foreign Revenue Laws
Justice Ginsburg attacks the distinction, drawn by the majority,
between direct and indirect enforcement of foreign revenue laws. In her
dissent, she points to the "functional equivalent" standard proffered by the
First Circuit in Boots.'57  This standard provides that the revenue rule
precludes prosecution under the wire fraud statute of a scheme to evade
foreign taxes if a "conviction would amount functionally to penal
enforcement of Canadian customs and tax laws."'' 8
reinstated its prior ruling which precluded the EC's suit. Id. at 178-79. The EC had filed a
civil action alleging that the defendant tobacco companies directed and facilitated the
smuggling of contraband cigarettes into its member states. Id. at 177-78. The EC, and its
member states, sought to recover damages for duties and taxes owed on the cigarettes. Id. at
177. Originally, the Second Circuit had concluded that "the revenue rule prohibited the
foreign sovereigns' civil claims for recovery of lost tax revenue and law enforcement costs"
in relation to the alleged smuggling activities of tobacco companies. European Cmty v. RJR
Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d 123, 127-28 (2d Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded, 125 . Ct. 1968
(2005), reinstated, 424 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2005).
154 The Second Circuit's reasoning indicates that future courts will not view the
Pasquantino decision as an "Open, sesame" ruling that swings the door wide open for
foreign sovereigns to bring unadjudicated tax claims into United States courts.
155 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1778-79.
156 Id.
"' Id. at 1786 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 587
(1st Cir. 1996)).
158 Boots, 80 F.3d at 587.
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However, a "functional equivalent" standard pertaining to indirect
enforcement has been adopted by few, if any, other courts. The Second and
Fourth Circuits have analyzed this concept and declined to adopt it.' 59 The
Second Circuit rejects the notion that a wire fraud prosecution for a scheme
to evade foreign taxes is "equivalent to an effort to collect those taxes on [a
foreign sovereign's] behalf.' 60  Further, the Second Circuit asserts that
vindication of the intended purpose of a domestic criminal statute should
not be thwarted simply because indirect enforcement of foreign revenue
laws is likely to result.' 6 1  Similarly, the Fourth Circuit finds that a
"functional equivalent" standard is inapplicable to prosecutions that
advance our government's strong interest in preventing misuse of the wires
as part of a "criminal fraudulent enterprise.'
62
3. The Discretionary Language Used to Define the Revenue Rule Weighs
Against a Conclusion that the Rule Bars Prosecutions Involving Indirect
Enforcement of Foreign Revenue Laws
The "functional equivalent" standard may have had difficulty gaining
traction in American courts due to the discretionary language in which the
revenue rule is frequently couched. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations, defines the revenue rule as follows: "Courts in the United States
are not required to recognize or to enforce judgments for the collection of
taxes, fines, or penalties rendered by the courts of other states."'163 In its
Reporter's Notes, the Restatement goes so far as to posit that even the
justification for neither recognizing nor enforcing foreign tax judgments "is
largely obsolete."' 64
Domestic courts may not be so ready to dispense with the revenue rule
altogether when it comes to direct enforcement of foreign tax judgments.
159 United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321, 330-31 (4th Cir. 2003), ajfd, 125 S. Ct.
1766 (2005) (noting that the First Circuit in Boots "missed the critical point that prosecution
for" a wire fraud violation, "even when the subject of the wire fraud scheme involved is
certain tax revenue due a foreign sovereign, does nothing civilly or criminally to enforce any
tax judgments or claims of a foreign sovereign"); United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 553
(2d Cir. 1997) ("Whether our decision today indirectly assists our Canadian neighbors in
keeping smugglers at bay or assists them in the collection of taxes is not our Court's
concern.").
160 United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 2000).
'61 Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 553.
162 Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 331.
163 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483 (1987). The Restatement is
created by the draft reporters of the American Law Institute. Kovatch, supra note 29, at 270.
164 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483 n.2.
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Yet, these courts describe the revenue rule in a manner that is "nearly
identical" 1 65 to the Restatement's discretionary definition. For instance, the
First Circuit has stated that the rule "holds that courts generally will not
enforce foreign tax judgments. ,,166 Similarly, the Second Circuit has
recognized that "our courts will normally not enforce foreign tax
judgments."' 67  The Ninth Circuit has explained that American courts
remain true to the notion that they "need not give effect to the penal or
revenue laws of foreign countries."'1 68 Finally, the district court for the
Eastern District of New York recently commented that "the revenue rule is
discretionary rather than jurisdictional."'
' 69
These discretionary definitions of the revenue rule put forth by the
judiciary signal that domestic courts are unlikely to find that the rule acts as
an absolute prohibition precluding recognition of a foreign sovereign's
revenue laws in any context. Taken from a more extreme perspective, these
discretionary definitions may be seen as dovetailing with the claim of some
scholars that the revenue rule is no more than "an archaic vestige of English
common law.'
170
Thus, American revenue rule jurisprudence lines up quite closely with
the majority's assertion that the rule stands only for the principle that courts
do not enforce the tax judgments or unadjudicated tax claims of a foreign
sovereign. 171 In turn, American revenue rule cases do not establish a clear
precedent barring the government from prosecuting a person under the wire
fraud statute for a scheme to evade foreign taxes. 172
165 Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 327.
166 United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 587 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483) (emphasis added).
167 United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 550 (2d Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
168 HM the Queen in Right of the Province of B.C. v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1165
n.10 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,413 (1964))
(emphasis added).
169 European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 2001),
aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 355 F.3d 123, 127-28 (2d Cir. 2004), vacated
and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 1968 (2005), reinstated, 424 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2005).
170 Kovatch, supra note 29, at 267.
171 Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1775 (2005); Banco Nacional de Cuba,
376 U.S. at 448 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that "our courts customarily refuse to enforce
the revenue and penal laws of foreign state").
172 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1774.
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4. The Traditional Rationales Justifying the Common Law Revenue Rule Do
Not Indicate that It Bars a Prosecution for a Scheme to Evade Foreign
Taxes
a. The Respect for National Sovereignty Rationale
For many, the revenue rule preserves respect for national sovereignty
by acting as a bulwark defending against the international friction or
embarrassment which could result from judicial evaluation of the public
policies underlying a foreign sovereign's laws. 7 3 Yet, the main thrust of
the government's prosecution is directed toward punishing individuals for
that portion of their overall conduct constituting misuse of United States
wires in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme. The government's pursuit of
its independent, sovereign interest in punishing domestic criminal conduct
need not lead a foreign sovereign to conclude that the policies underlying
its revenue laws are being ridiculed or discounted.
Further, prosecutors bringing charges of wire fraud violations are
agents of the executive branch. 74 Presumably, they carefully assess the
potential impact that a wire fraud prosecution will have upon America's
relationship with a foreign sovereign. The Executive has "ample authority
and competence to manage... relations between [a] foreign state and its
own citizens."'' 75 Admittedly, prosecutorial discretion is not a foolproof
safeguard. Yet, this intermediate step makes it unlikely that prosecution for
a scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue will result in
international friction. To date, there appear to be no case precedents in
which a court has applied the common law revenue rule to bar a prosecution
"accompanied by such a safeguard," namely the prior judgment call of a
prosecutor.176 Indeed, it is plausible that the Judiciary is more apt to
interfere with the Executive's foreign policymaking decisions by routinely
declining to review wire fraud prosecutions based upon prudential
considerations when these judgment calls have already been made.
b. The Separation of Powers Rationale
Revenue rule proponents also assert that the rule maintains a proper
separation of powers among our branches of government. Yet, a breach of
the separation of powers does not occur in a prosecution for a scheme to
173 Id. at 1779; Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J.,
concurring), affd, 231 U.S. 18 (1930).
174 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1779.




evade foreign taxes. Indeed, "when the executive branch affirmatively
consents to litigation... there is little reason to worry about infringing on
the executive's sphere of decision-making, and the rule will not be
applied."'' 77 So long as the federal prosecutor controls initiation of such
actions, the judiciary will not be placing itself at odds with the Executive's
foreign policy goals by allowing these actions to proceed. 178 Further, no
breach arises between the executive and legislative branches since
prosecutors initiate these actions as part of a good faith effort to interpret
and apply Congress's intent in enacting the wire fraud statute. In this sense,
the Executive can simply be viewed as acting pursuant to its constitutional
mandate to "take [care] that the [laws] be faithfully executed."'
179
c. The Judicial Competency Rationale
A final justification underlying the revenue rule is the claim that courts
lack the necessary competence to assess the validity of foreign tax
schemes.' 80 Undoubtedly, foreign tax laws involve a degree of complexity.
Yet, this inherent complexity need not be insurmountable for federal courts
equipped with appropriate tools for interpreting foreign tax laws. The
common law methods and state analogs previously relied upon by courts for
interpreting foreign laws were cumbersome and inadequate. 18' However,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1 equips the federal courts with
sufficient means to resolve the incidental foreign law issues that might arise
in wire fraud prosecutions. 
182
Furthermore, federal courts are called upon in a variety of contexts to
evaluate foreign laws that range across a broad spectrum of complexity.
One conspicuous example was, ironically, pointed out in Justice Ginsburg's
own dissent in Pasquantino; namely the extradition requests of foreign
sovereigns.' 3  Justice Ginsburg asserted that Canada had the "primary
interest in the matter at stake" and that "United States citizens who have
committed criminal violations of Canadian tax law [could] be extradited to
stand trial in Canada."'' 84 Arguably, these comments were simply meant to
177 European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, 424 F.3d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 2005).
178 Republic of Ecuador v. Philip Morris Cos., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1364-65 (S.D. Fla.
2002), aff'd, 341 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2003).
179 U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 3.
180 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1780.
181 Nussbaum, supra note 120, at 60, 66-67.
182 See supra notes 119-123 and the text accompanying those notes regarding the
application of FRCP 26.1 and the manner in which the Rule aids the evidentiary process for
federal courts.
183 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1782 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
184 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 96
PASQUANTINO v. UNITED STATES
buttress Justice Ginsburg's contention that Canadian courts had greater
familiarity with their nation's excise laws and, in turn, were better
"positioned to decide 'whether, and to what extent, the defendants [had]
defrauded... Canada... out of tax revenue owed .... Even so,
judicial review of extradition requests carries an express obligation to
evaluate the elements, purposes, and punishments associated with foreign
laws. Absent a contrary provision in an extradition treaty, for an offense to
be extraditable, "the act charged must ordinarily be considered criminal by
both nations. '1 86 This rule of "double criminality" provides that the offense
must be serious and punishable under the laws of both countries and it is
satisfied if the two nations' laws are "substantially analogous."'1 87 If federal
courts can fairly and accurately interpret complex foreign criminal laws
during extradition proceedings, it seems likely that they also possess the
competency to assess foreign tax laws.
B. PROSECUTION FOR A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD A FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT OF TAX REVENUE SATISFIES THE LITERAL TERMS
OF THE WIRE FRAUD STATUTE
1. A Smuggling Enterprise Constitutes "a Scheme or Artifice to Defraud"
Ample case precedent indicates that the defendants' smuggling
enterprise constituted a scheme "designed to defraud by representations"
'188
which, in turn, was a "scheme or artifice to defraud" Canada of taxes due on
185 Id. at 1782-83 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Pasquantino, 336
F.3d 321, 343 (4th Cir. 2003) (Gregory, J., dissenting), aft'd, 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005)).
186 31A Am. JUR. 2D EXTRADITION § 40 (2005).
187 Id. As explained by the authors of American Jurisprudence, the principle of dual
criminality does not require that the laws of the surrendering and requesting states replicate
each other exactly. Id. Also, dual criminality is not "defeated" by differences in the
instrumentalities or stated purposes of the two nations' laws. Id. Further, even "if a
complaint charges two offenses, only one of which is extraditable under the treaty, the
detention of the accused person is [still] lawful." Id. Finally, extradition is not precluded
when defenses available to the defendants in the surrendering state are not available in the
requesting state. Id.
188 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct at 1773 (citing Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313
(1896)); see also United States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492, 496 (4th Cir. 1975). Beginning in
1996, and continuing through May 2000, the defendants conducted a sizeable liquor
smuggling operation which fed into the black market for liquor in Canada. Pasquantino, 336
F.3d at 324-25. The success of this operation relied upon the regular concealment of
imported liquor from Canadian officials and the failure to declare this same liquor on
customs forms. Id. at 333. Such conduct amounted to a representation to Canadian customs




the imported liquor. 89 Courts have described a scheme to defraud as "one
reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and
comprehension."'' 90 They have also emphasized that the term "scheme to
defraud" is assessed by a standard that is "a reflection of moral uprightness,
of fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing in the general [and]
business life of members of society."' 19 Further, a scheme to defraud can
result from "an assertion of a material falsehood with the intent to deceive
[or the] active concealment of a material fact with the intent to deceive."'
192
A fact is deemed to be material if it would naturally influence or is capable
of influencing the intended victim. 1
93
The failure to make the requisite declarations of goods influenced
Canadian customs officials to permit the vehicles transporting the liquor
into Canada without further inspection. 94  As a result, the defendants'
conduct amounted to active concealment of a material fact with intent to
deceive. 195 Additionally, smuggling activities run afoul of "fundamental
notions of honesty, fair play, and right dealing."'
196
2. A Government's Right to Uncollected Taxes Constitutes "Property " in
the Victim's Hands
Courts construe the "property" requirement of the mail and wire fraud
statutes quite broadly.t 97 In general, they deem uncollected taxes owed to a
government to be property in that government's hands.'9 8 Thus, courts
consistently permit prosecutions for schemes to defraud federal or state
governments of taxes owed to them. 199 For example, the Ninth Circuit has
189 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1773.
190 United States v. Drake, 932 F.2d 861, 863 (10th Cir. 1991).
191 United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 550 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing United States v.
Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1005 n.12 (2d Cir. 1980)).
192 Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 333.
193 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22, 24 (1999).
194 Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 333.
195 Id.
196 Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 550 n.3.
197 See Fountain v. United States, 357 F.3d 250, 256 (2d Cir. 2004).
198 Id. at 257.
199 Id. at 251-52 (holding that taxes owed to a government could qualify as property in its
hands within the meaning of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes). See also United States
v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (federal tax revenue); United States v. Helmsley,
941 F.2d 71, 94 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming defendant's mail fraud conviction for tax fraud);
United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1360 (2d Cir. 1989) (reasoning that the intangible
nature of New York State's interest in uncollected taxes owed did not serve as an obstacle to
a mail fraud prosecution); United States v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1983);
United States v. Melvin, 544 F.2d 767, 773-74 (5th Cir. 1977) (mail fraud in connection with
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upheld mail fraud convictions that are based on the defendants' filing of
200false tax returns. In a similar vein, the Seventh Circuit has reasoned that
the federal government's property right in income tax revenue meets the
44 201money or property" requirement for mail and wire fraud convictions.
Also, the Second Circuit has found that taxes owed to the Canadian
government, although uncollected, were still property in the hands of that
government for the purposes of the mail and wire statutes' "money or
property" requirement. These decisions are consistent with the manner in
which the government's right to collect taxes has traditionally been viewed
by the Supreme Court outside the framework of the mail and wire fraud
statutes.2°3
Moreover, the Supreme Court's holding in Cleveland v. United States
is not at odds with the consensus among the courts that a government's
right to taxes owed constitutes "property" under the mail and wire fraud
statutes.204 In Cleveland, a unanimous Supreme Court asserted that it was
not enough that the object of a scheme to defraud "[might] become property
in the recipient's hands. 20 5 Rather, "for the purposes of the mail fraud
statute, the thing obtained must be property in the hands of the victim."
20 6
There, the Supreme Court decided that unissued state video poker licenses
did not qualify as "property" within the meaning of the mail fraud statute.20 7
Yet, that conclusion rests, primarily, upon the notion that the government's
ability to regulate liquor sales by itself does not constitute property.
20 8
Indeed, monetary loss was not involved in the offense underlying the
Cleveland conviction. 209 Thus, Cleveland's holding can be reconciled with
the consensus of the courts by recognizing that, while unissued regulatory
licenses may not constitute property, "the sales taxes that the government
interstate sale of cigarettes); United States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492, 496-97 (4th Cir. 1975)
(same); United States v. Mirabile, 503 F.2d 1065, 1066 (8th Cir. 1974) (mail fraud in
connection with false state tax return).
200 United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d 1204, 1216 (9th Cir. 1976).
201 United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1310 (7th Cir. 1989).
202 Fountain, 357 F.3d at 260.
203 Id. at 257. The Court has held that a taxpayer has a positive "duty to pay [his] tax"
and that the government "possess[es] the right of use of the money owed" rather than the
taxpayer. Manning v. Seeley Tube & Box Co. of N.J., 338 U.S. 561, 565-66 (1950).
204 Fountain, 357 F.3d at 257.
205 Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 15 (2000) (emphasis added).
206 Id.
207 Id.




can anticipate from transactions in" the regulated goods or services "are
property under the mail and wire fraud statutes. 21
C. JUSTICE THOMAS'S READING OF THE WIRE FRAUD STATUTE GIVES
SECTION 1343 UNINTENDED EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT
1. When Evaluated in a Broader Context that Extends Beyond the Statute's
Literal Terms, the Majority's Reading Gives the Statute Unintended
Extraterritorial Effect
The majority provides substantial support for its conclusion that the
fraudulent scheme at issue satisfies the wire fraud statute's literal terms.
However, the majority opinion makes short shrift of Justice Ginsburg's
extraterritoriality concerns. In a single paragraph, the majority dismisses
the notion that its reading of the wire fraud statute has unintended
extraterritorial effect by making two brief points. 21 1 First, it notes that the
government's aim is to punish the domestic element of the defendants'
conduct.212 Second, it concludes that Congress must have had more than
"domestic concerns in mind" 213 since the statute punishes frauds executed
"in interstate or foreign commerce. ''21 4  Beyond these two assertions,
nothing more is said.
The absence of a satisfactory exploration of the extraterritoriality issue
is disconcerting. Both the sentence length and restitution amount resulting
from a wire fraud conviction are determined, in part, by calculating the
monetary loss suffered by the foreign sovereign due to the uncollected
taxes. Indeed, as pertains to restitution, Congress "has expressed with
notable clarity a policy of mandatory restitution in all wire fraud
prosecutions. 21 5 Further, a strong connection exists between the domestic
criminal conduct which the government seeks to punish (i.e., misuse of the
United States wires in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme) and the
extraterritorial conduct that leads to the culmination of the fraudulent
scheme. Without clearer guidance from Congress as to the statute's
intended scope, future courts should not be placed in the position of
210 Id.
211 Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1780 (2005).
212 Id.
213 Id. at 1780-81 (citing Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1755 (2005)).
214 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
215 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act of 1996 applies to all "offenses against property" and directs that
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.., the court shall order... that the defendant
make restitution to the victim of the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.
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handing down prison sentences and ordering restitution awards calculated,
in many cases, on the combined impact of domestic and extraterritorial
conduct. Such a result would give rise to unintended extraterritorial effect.
Justice Ginsburg admonished the majority for extending the reach of
the wire fraud statute to apply to circumstances that were largely
extraterritorial.216 A significant portion of the criminal conduct entailed in
the smuggling operation occurred in Canada. 17 The fraudulent scheme
supplied Canada's black market with liquor and had the end result of
depriving Canada of revenue due under its customs and tax laws.2 8
Further, the statute was "[s]ilent on its application to activity culminating
beyond our borders" since its language did not express a clear,
unambiguous intent on the part of Congress to give it extraterritorial
effect.219 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg stressed that "Congress legislates
against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality. ' 220 This
presumption means that Congress ordinarily intends for its legislative
enactments to have domestic, as opposed to extraterritorial, application.2
By and large, the extraterritoriality canon restricts federal statutes from
reaching conduct beyond United States borders.22
Justice Ginsburg's concerns reflect the delicate balance that the
Supreme Court seeks to maintain in defining the wire fraud statute's proper
boundaries. On the one hand, the statute is seen as having broad
applicability to a diverse spectrum of fraudulent schemes. 23 On the other
hand, the Court must prevent imprudent readings of the statute from
216 Id. at 1781 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
217 Id. at 1783-84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2"8 Id. at 1781-82 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing Canada's "primary interest in
the matter at stake"); see also Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 286 (1949) (holding that,
in general, the Court does not interpret statutes to reach conduct that is "the primary concern
of a foreign country"). But see F. Hoffman La-Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 124 S. Ct.
2359, 2366 (2004) (referring to the presumption that "legislators take account of the
legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they write American laws").
219 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1781 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 1782 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
221 Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1755 (2005) (stating that "[t]he Court has
adopt[ed] the legal presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have
domestic, not extraterritorial, application").
222 Id. at 1761 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
223 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1784 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("This Court has several
times observed that the wire fraud statute has a long arm, extending to 'everything designed
to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the
future."' (quoting Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896))). But see Nirav Shah,
Mail and Wire Fraud, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 825, 832 (2003) ("The mail and wire fraud
statutes are broadly applied, but not without limit.").
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flourishing. In the absence of such a judicial safeguard, a detrimental
expansion of the reach of federal criminal law could result.224  When
viewed together, the legislative history, proper statutory construction, and
tensions between the statute and other enactments reveal that the majority's
reading of the statute tips the balance toward a harmful extension of federal
criminal law. Therefore, Justice Ginsburg gets the better of the
extraterritoriality argument.
2. The Wire Fraud Statute 's Legislative History Indicates that the
Majority's Reading Gives the Statute Unintended Extraterritorial Effect
The legislative history pertinent to the wire fraud statute is sparse.
Further, the minimal substantive guidance to be gleaned from it cuts against
the majority's conclusion that a scheme to evade foreign taxes falls within
the statute's intended scope. At its inception in 1952, the wire fraud statute
was simply one of many amendments to the Communications Act and was
advanced without any textual explanation as to the statute's scope.225 In
1956, Congress revisited the wire fraud statute and modified its language.226
The purpose of the modification was to close a "loophole" that "limit[ed]
the prosecution of frauds involving wire, radio, and television
communication to interstate [transmissions] only. 2 27 The new statutory
language ensured that foreign communications came under the purview of
the wire fraud statute.
At the prompting of the Attorney General, Congress modified the wire
fraud statute to include the phrase "in interstate or foreign commerce.'
228
Specifically, the Attorney General had alerted Congress to a California
criminal prosecution under the wire fraud statute involving wire
communications between Mexico and Los Angeles.22 9 The district court
224 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1784 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
225 H.R. REP. No. 82-1750 (1952). The bill as a whole resulted from more than a decade
of congressional inquiry and debate. Id. However, the general statement of the House
Report fails to even mention the wire fraud statute. In fact, a general statement shedding
light upon the concerns leading to the creation of the wire fraud statute itself was not
provided until the statute's language was modified in 1956. S. REP. No. 84-1873, at 1
(1956); H.R. REP. No. 84-2385, at 1 (1956).
226 H.R. REP. No. 84-2385; S. REP. No. 84-1873.
22' H.R. REP. No. 84-2385 at 1. The term "interstate" appearing within the passage
"transmitted by means of interstate wire" was deleted and the phrase "in interstate or foreign
commerce" was inserted following the passage "transmitted by means of wire, radio, or
television communication." H.R. REP. No. 84-2385, at 3; S. REP. No. 84-1873, at 1.
22' H.R. REP. No. 84-2385, at 2; S. REP. No. 84-1873, at 3.
229 S. REP. No. 84-1873, at 2-3. The Senate Report included a letter dated March 30,
1956, sent from Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr. at the Department of Justice, and
addressed to the Vice President in his role as President of the Senate. Id. The letter
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had concluded that the scheme could not be prosecuted under the statute
because the wire communications, serving as key evidence, originated from
outside of the United States. 230 Arguably, the impetus for adding the "in
interstate or foreign commerce" language to the statute was a focus on
domestic schemes, and concomitant domestic injuries, resulting from
misuse of the wires outside the United States, not on protecting the interests
of foreign jurisdictions. The phrase "in interstate or foreign commerce"
cannot bear the conclusive weight that the majority places upon it to
support the claim that the wire fraud statute "is surely not a statute in which
Congress had only 'domestic concerns in mind.' ' 23' Therefore, the Court
was wrong to focus on the phrase "in interstate or foreign commerce"
without considering the origins of that wording.
3. Principles of Statutory Construction Indicate that the Majority's Reading
Gives the Wire Fraud Statute Unintended Extraterritorial Effect
The Supreme Court's general approach to statutory interpretation of
expansive, yet ambiguous terms indicates that the majority's reading of the
wire fraud statute has unauthorized, extraterritorial effect. While the phrase
"any scheme or artifice to defraud" implies broad application, a catchall
phrase is not meant to catch everything.232 So, a court must look beyond
the literal terms themselves. As the Supreme Court aptly stated just prior to
the statute's enactment, "words having universal scope ... will be taken, as
a matter of course, to [apply to] only every one subject to such legislation,
not all that the legislator subsequently may be able to catch. 233 Just as
Congress may or may not intend to include persons outside United States
jurisdiction when it uses the statutory phrase "any person," it may or may
not intend to include certain fraudulent schemes involving strong
emphasized that the decision in Wentz demonstrated the need for § 1343 to reach both
interstate and foreign communications. Wentz v. United States, 244 F.2d 172, 175-76 (9th
Cir. 1957). It should be noted that the federal district court opinion appears not to have been
published; however, it was referenced and discussed in the Ninth Circuit's later opinion.
230 Wentz, 244 F.2d at 173.
231 Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1781 (2005) (citation omitted).
232 Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1755 (2005); Flora v. United States, 362 U.S.
145, 149 (1960) (noting that a "catchall" phrase does not "define what it catches").
233 Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 288 n.3 (1949); United States v. Palmer, 3
Wheat. 610, 631 (1818) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[G]eneral words," such as the word "any," must
"be limited" in their application "to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply
them."). But see Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1758 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("In concluding that
'any' means not what it says, but rather 'a subset of any,' the Court distorts the plain
meaning of the statute.").
2006]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
interdependence between domestic and foreign conduct when it employs
the phrase "any scheme or artifice to defraud.,
234
The need for unambiguous direction in congressional statutes dovetails
nicely with the dictates of the rule of lenity. This rule provides that, when a
court must decide between "two rational readings of a criminal statute,. one
harsher than the other," the court may "choose the harsher only when
Congress has spoken in clear and definite language. 235 In essence, the rule
of lenity acts as a device for reining in overbroad criminal statutes by
requiring that statutory ambiguities be resolved in the defendant's favor and
encouraging legislators to clarify contested issues of crime definition.236
The Court's adherence to the rule of lenity is especially important in light of
the fact that "legislators define crimes prospectively," and, thus, at the time
a statute is enacted they cannot "know the precise mix of cases that will be
brought under [that] statute., 237  Consequently, legislators are routinely
trading off the risks that a statute may create too broad or too narrow a
scope for criminal liability. 238 The Court can apply the rule of lenity to
provide a signal that further legislative clarification of a statute is in order.
The Supreme Court's approach to statutory construction, as outlined
by Justice Ginsburg, should not be equated to a "clear statement" rule
saddling Congress with a special burden of specificity. 239 Rather, it simply
asserts that the Court should adhere to an ordinary assumption about the
reach of domestically oriented statutes. Such an approach is provident
when other "indicia of intent" such as legislative history, case precedent, or
related enactments suggest that Congress did not consider application of the
234 Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1754-55.
235 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987)).
236 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505,
561-62 (2001). The author does note, however, that the rule of lenity might actually cause
more overcriminalization than it prevents because a strong rule of lenity could increase the
incentive for legislators to resolve contested issues of crime definitions in advance in the
government's favor. Id. at 561. Further, courts dislike having their decisions overturned by
statute and may very well internalize legislative preferences when construing statutes. Id. at
562.
237 Id. at 547.
238 Id.
239 Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1761 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 261 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the extraterritoriality
"canon is not a 'clear statement' rule, the application of which relieves a court of the duty to
give effect to all available indicia of the legislative will"). Clear statement rules operate less
to reveal actual congressional intent than to shield important values from an insufficiently
strong legislative intent to displace them. Id. at 262 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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statute to largely extraterritorial conduct. 240 Also, the presumption against
extraterritoriality remains open to rebuttal in the form of direct statutory
language, history, or purpose. As the wire fraud provision is a criminal
statute, its language should be construed with due caution in the absence of
sufficient evidence of a contrary congressional intent to apply the statute to
strongly intertwined domestic and foreign conduct. Thus, the majority errs
in concluding that the broad language of the statute authorizes the
government to prosecute for a scheme to evade foreign taxes.2 4'
4. The Majority's Expansive Reading of the Wire Fraud Statute Conflicts
with the Express Purposes of Other Congressional Enactments
The majority's interpretation of the wire fraud statute is disconcerting,
in part, because of its awkward fit with several congressional enactments.
First, the application of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act 242 to wire
fraud offenses indicates that the majority's reading of the statute has
extraterritorial effect as concerns restitution awards. The MVRA codifies,
inter alia, a policy of mandatory restitution in all wire fraud prosecutions.243
Thus, a court must order a defendant convicted of a scheme under the wire
fraud statute to pay restitution to all victims for the losses they suffered
from the defendant's conduct in the course of the scheme. 2" However, at
the district court level, the government found itself placed in the
uncomfortable position of discouraging the court from ordering the
defendants' to pay restitution because the victim was a foreign sovereign
and the loss resulted from uncollected taxes owed. 245 It is unlikely that
Congress intended for federal prosecutors to invite courts to ignore the
express language of the MVRA in order to make it consistent with the
ambiguous terms of the wire fraud statute. Thus, the majority's
interpretation of the statute gives it extraterritorial effect by extending the
statute's reach to cover schemes to defraud victims of foreign property.
246
240 Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1756.
241 Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 132 (2004) (stating that "any" means
"different things depending upon the setting"); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S.
350, 357 (1994) (holding that the "respondent errs in placing dispositive weight on the broad
statutory reference to 'any' law enforcement officer or agency without considering the rest
of the statute").
242 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2000).
243 Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1787 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
244 United States v. Dickerson, 370 F.3d 1330, 1335-36 (11 th Cir. 2004).




Second, the majority's expansion of the wire fraud statute's scope is at
odds with the anti-smuggling provision.247 This provision criminalizes
schemes of the same genre as the one at issue in Pasquantino248 and bars
the transport of goods by vessel "into the territory of any foreign
government in violation of the laws there in force., 249 Further, the anti-
smuggling statute sets forth a reciprocity requirement which expressly
demands that the victim nation have reciprocal legislation on their books
aimed at helping the United States stave off harmful smuggling. ° Canada
has no such reciprocal legislation in place. 251 Thus, the majority's reading
would permit the wire fraud statute to reach defendants carrying on a
smuggling enterprise causing injury to a foreign sovereign when the anti-
smuggling statute itself would prohibit such criminal liability.252 Equally
disturbing, is the fact that the Pasquantinos were sentenced to prison terms
of over four years when the anti-smuggling statute only calls for a fine or
imprisonment of "not more than two years.,
253
Finally, the restitution orders resulting from the application of the wire
fraud statute to schemes to evade foreign taxes diverge sharply from the
procedures outlined in the tax treaties that the United States has established
with Canada.254 After extensive negotiation and review, the two countries
established a tax protocol providing for collection assistance with respect to
each nation's tax claims. 55 There are two important features to note
regarding the protocol. First, the protocol states that neither nation is
required to "interpret or calculate liability under the other's tax statutes.
256
247 18 U.S.C. § 546. The statute provides, in pertinent part, that
any person... smuggling, or attempting to smuggle, or assisting in smuggling, any merchandise
into the territory of any foreign government in violation of the laws there in force, if under the
laws of such foreign government any penalty or forfeiture is provided for violation of the laws of
the United States respecting the customs revenue ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both.
Id.
248 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1785 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
249 18 U.S.C. § 546.
250 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1786 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 18 U.S.C. § 546. David and Carl Pasquantino were convicted on all six counts of the
indictment and sentenced to fifty-seven months' imprisonment on each count, to be served
concurrently. United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2003), ajfd, 125 S.
Ct. 1766 (2005). Arthur Hilts, an accomplice, was sentenced to twenty-one months'
imprisonment. Id. at 326.
254 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1786 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
255 Protocol, supra note 147, at art. 15, 2.
256 id.
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As a result, the protocol is meant to apply to fully and finally adjudicated
tax claims resolved under the law of the requesting nation. Second, unlike
the sentencing results in Pasquantino, the protocol prohibits "assistance in
collecting any claim against a citizen or corporation of 'the requested
State."'257  It is unlikely that Congress sought to provide tax collection
assistance under the wire fraud statute which it specifically chose not to
grant under the tax protocol.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's determination that the revenue rule does not bar
prosecution for a scheme to defraud a foreign nation of tax revenue was
correct. However, the Court erred by concluding that such a scheme fell
within the intended scope of the wire fraud statute. It is true that American
revenue rule jurisprudence does not preclude prosecution for domestic
criminal conduct which leads to indirect enforcement of foreign revenue
laws as a byproduct, and the Court is on firm ground in asserting that the
traditional rationales underlying the rule do not indicate that such a
prosecution should be barred. However, the legislative history, principles
of statutory construction, and tensions with other congressional enactments
all strongly suggest that a scheme to evade foreign taxes falls outside the
intended scope of the statute. A contrary reading of the statute gives it
unintended extraterritorial effect.
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